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MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN
CONSUMER CONTRACTS: A LEGALLY
PERMISSIBLE MEANS OF DENYING CONSUMERS
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO LITIGATE
CONTRACT DISPUTES IN COURT
AND THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
by
Victor D. López, J.D., Esq.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer contracts have
had a checkered past in the United States. Courts historically
viewed arbitration as a means of settling disputes with
significant disfavor, a fact that has been noted by many courts,
including the United States Supreme Court in numerous
decisions as well as by Congress. 1
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925
in order to overcome the judicial resistance to arbitration and
declare a national policy to favor arbitration of claims that
parties agree to settle through arbitration. 2 Since its enactment,
the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA as requiring
that “questions of arbitrability . . . be addressed with a healthy
regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration” 3 and has
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admonished lower courts to “rigorously enforce agreements to
arbitrate.” 4
Some commentators write in support of arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts by noting that arbitration is generally faster
and cheaper than litigation as a means of resolving disputes. 5
Further, arguments advanced in support of arbitration include
the elimination of the uncertainty that can result from jury
verdicts, and the cost savings to over-taxed publicly funded
judicial systems. 6 These and other arguments in support of
binding arbitration clauses in consumer contracts have some
merit. Critics, however, note that there are important questions
about basic fairness and due process raised by the ubiquitous
mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer contracts in light of
the broad interpretation of the FAA by the U.S. Supreme Court
preempting state regulation of these clauses. The same is true
of class arbitration waiver clauses in consumer contracts that
prevent consumers from joining class action suits and require a
case-by-case resolution of consumer claims in separate
arbitrations by each aggrieved consumer. Because both
mandatory arbitration and class action waiver clauses can
effectively bar consumers from access to the courts, it is
important to examine whether the ends of justice are best
served by such clauses or whether Congress needs to set some
limits on such clauses when consumer contracts are involved.
II. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S INTERPRETATION
OF THE FAA
Congressional hearings relating to the FAA make it clear that
Congress intended the act to apply to merchant-to-merchant
arbitrations but not to merchant-to-consumer arbitrations. 7 The
purpose of the FAA was to make arbitration agreements
enforceable in federal courts and toprovide a simple and
expeditious process that would allow merchants to resolve their
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disputes more cheaply and easily. 8 “The FAA was a bill of
limited scope, intended to apply in disputes between merchants
of approximately equal economic strength to questions arising
out of their daily relations.” 9 Congressional hearings preceding
the FAA’s enactment demonstrate the Act was intended to apply
to contracts involving two merchants agreeing to arbitrate future
disputes. 10 Be that as it may, the U.S. Supreme Court has made
it very clear that the FAA applies to consumer contracts as well
as to contracts between merchants.
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 11 a cellular phone
contract between AT&T and the respondents provided for
arbitration of all disputes arising out of the agreement and
included a class action waiver requiring preventing aggrieved
parties from banding together in class action arbitration. 12
Respondents brought suit in the District Court for the Southern
District of California that was later consolidated with a putative
class action against AT&T for false advertisement and fraud by
charging sales tax on the full value of phones advertised as
“free” to consumers. 13 AT&T then moved to compel arbitration
and petitioners opposed the motion arguing the arbitration
agreement was unconscionable and unlawfully exculpatory
under California law because it disallowed class action. 14 The
District Court denied AT&T’s motion and the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing with the District Court that
the class waiver provision was unconscionable under California
law as announced in Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36
Cal.4th 148 (2005). 15 The Supreme Court reversed in a 5-4
decision, quoting from the FAA as follows:
“A written provision in any maritime transaction
or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and
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enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. 16
The majority reasoned that the saving clause permits agreements
to arbitrate to be invalidated by generally applicable contract
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, but not by
defenses that apply only to arbitration itself or an agreement to
arbitrate 17 In other words, the validity of the agreement to
arbitrate itself cannot be the basis of a claim of
unconscionability.
A second recent U.S. Supreme Court case challenging the
enforcement of an arbitration clause with a class action waiver
is American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant 18 The case
involved an agreement between petitioners, American Express
and a subsidiary, and respondents, merchants who accept
American Express cards, requiring all of their disputes to be
resolved by arbitration and provided that there “shall be no right
or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action
basis.” 19 Respondents brought a class action against petitioners
for violations of the federal antitrust laws, claiming that
American Express used its monopoly power in the market for
charge cards to force merchants to accept credit cards at rates
approximately 30% higher than the fees for competing credit
cards. 20 Petitioners moved to compel individual arbitration
under the FAA and respondents opposed the motion, submitting
a declaration from an economist who estimated that the cost of
an expert analysis necessary to prove the antitrust claims would
be “at least several hundred thousand dollars, and might exceed
$1 million,” while the maximum recovery for an individual
plaintiff would be $12,850, or $38,549 when trebled. 21 The
District Court granted the motion and dismissed the lawsuits, but
the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further
proceedings. It held that because respondents had established
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that they would incur prohibitive costs if compelled to arbitrate
under the class action waiver, the waiver was unenforceable and
the arbitration could not proceed. 22 The U.S. Supreme Court
then granted certiorari, vacated the judgment and remanded for
further consideration in light of Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp. 23 which held that a party may not be
compelled to submit to class arbitration absent an agreement to
do so. 24 The Court of Appeals stood by its reversal, stating that
its earlier ruling did not compel class arbitration and the U.S.
Supreme Court once again granted certiorari to determine
“[w]hether the Federal Arbitration Act permits courts . . . to
invalidate arbitration agreements on the ground that they do not
permit class arbitration of a federal-law claim.” 25 The Court
held the FAA does not permit courts to invalidate a contractual
waiver of class arbitration on the ground that the plaintiff's cost
of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the
potential recovery. 26 The Court then went on to state in reliance
on prior cases the overarching principle that arbitration is a
matter of contract, that the FAA requires courts to rigorously
enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms, even for
claims alleging a violation of a federal statute, unless the FAA's
mandate has been overridden by a contrary congressional
command (citations omitted). 27
III.
THE NEED TO DISTINGUISH CONSUMER
CONTRACTS FROM NON-CONSUMER CONTRACTS
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held the arbitration and
class action waiver clauses in merchants’ contracts with
American Express effectively prevented merchants from filing
class a class action suit in court or banding together for a class
action arbitration against American Express because of the
prohibitively high cost of proving antitrust claims individually. 28
The U.S. Supreme Court noted in reversing the Second Circuit
decision in Italian Colors that “the antitrust laws do not
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guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of
every claim.” 29 The holding in Italian Colors that class action
arbitration clauses in contracts cannot be invalidated merely
because the cost of arbitration exceeds any potential recovery,
coupled with the interpretation of the FAA as requiring courts to
rigorously enforce contracts according to their terms, is
particularly troubling when contracts between merchants and
consumers are involved.
Generally speaking, contracts between merchants involve
parties with greater sophistication and real bargaining power that
can provide some room for negotiation. The same is not true of
adhesion contracts offered to consumers on a take it or leave it
basis. 30 Merchants are also much likelier to understand the
ramifications, limitations and potential costs involved with
arbitration and class waiver clauses in business-to-business
contracts where some negotiation to limit or omit these clauses
may be possible. 31 Not so with consumers who encounter these
clauses in boilerplate language at the point of sale when
selecting a cell phone carrier, renting an automobile, insuring
their house, car, health or life, or being admitted to a hospital for
treatment. They have no bargaining power to strike an
arbitration or class action waiver clause from a contract for a
needed product or service even if they actually read the contract
carefully, know that these clauses are binding, and understand
the consequences of signing the contract that gives away their
right to sue (including in a small claims court at nominal cost
when modest damages are involved) if the contract is breached.
Firms that include arbitration clauses in consumer contracts
tout the benefits of arbitration both for themselves and for their
customers. 32 One study examined the contractual practices by
well-known firms marketing consumer products and compared
the firms’ consumer contracts with contracts the same firms
negotiated with business peers. 33 The findings of the study were
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telling:
In sum, despite their rhetorical stance in favor of
arbitration, the firms in our sample did not
uniformly include arbitration clauses in their
contracts. Instead, the use of arbitration clauses
varied markedly according to the contract type:
arbitration clauses appeared routinely in
employment contracts (92.9 percent), frequently
in consumer contracts (76.9 percent), and rarely
in non-employment, non-consumer business
contracts (6.1 percent). In consumer contracts,
mandatory arbitration clauses were coupled
uniformly with provisions barring class
arbitration, and frequently with non-severability
clauses and waivers of class litigation. 34
The study also found that every consumer contract with a
mandatory arbitration clause also included a waiver of the right
to participate in class-wide arbitration. 35 This led the study’s
authors to conclude that “[t]he most likely explanation for the
pattern we observed is that firms value arbitration clauses for
their effects in suppressing aggregate proceedings by
consumers, and perhaps averting liability for widespread but
low-value wrongs.” 36
IV. THE HIDDEN COST OF ARBITRATION
An oft-touted benefit of arbitration, including mandatory
arbitration clause in consumer contracts, is that it is less
expensive and faster than traditional litigation in the courts.37
And while this statement holds true in many cases when
litigation involves significant damages that would otherwise end
up in the courts of record at the state or federal levels, it is highly
questionable when the damages suffered by a consumer are
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within the jurisdiction of a small claims court where access is
inexpensive and, unlike state and federal trial courts, it will not
take years for a civil case to be heard. In New York, for example,
where both the general cost of living and legal fees are much
higher than the national average, one can access a small claims
court for a $15 filing fee in city courts for claims of up to $1,000
or $20 for claims between $1,000 and $5,000. 38 For town or
village courts the filing fee is $10 for claims of up to $1,000 and
$15 for claims between $1,000– $3,000. 39 Defendants are served
by regular and certified mail by the clerk of the court 40 so service
of process is not a separate expense in most cases. In the event
that service by mail is ineffective and service of process must be
done in person, the plaintiff can have a friend or family member
at least 18 years of age not involved in the case serve the
defendant at no cost, or a process server can be used. 41 Sheriffs
can also serve process on behalf of litigants. The fee in
Manhattan (New York County) for a sheriff to serve papers, as
an example, is currently $52. 42 Thus a resident of New York City
who wants to dispute a $300 charge imposed by her cell phone
carrier for overages or long distance calls she did not make on
her phone can sue the carrier for a cost of $15. And if her cell
phone catches fire and causes her severe burns, she could also
sue the phone maker for up to $5,000 for a total cost of $20. But
if her contract for cellular service or phone purchase with her
carrier contains a mandatory arbitration clause, these avenues
will be closed to her. And the arbitration clause could specify
that the arbitration fees will be split between the parties or even
paid in whole by the losing party. In addition, the arbitration
clause could specify where the arbitration must take place
(which could pose inconvenience and travel expenses for the
consumer), what state laws would apply, and the choice of
arbitration service, among other important restrictions that could
make it expensive and unfeasible to arbitrate.
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Moreover, although the up-front costs for consumer
arbitration are modest, they are much higher than the cost of
filing in small claims court were that an option. The American
Arbitration Association (AAA) requires a non-refundable filing
fee of $200 if a consumer initiates arbitration pursuant to a predispute arbitration agreement, with the business paying the
remaining fees. 43 JAMS, a competing international provider of
arbitration services, treats consumer arbitration in a similar way,
requiring consumers to pay an up-front fee of $250 if the
consumer initiates arbitration, with the business paying all other
required fees. 44 In arbitrations conducted under the auspices of
both AAA and JAMS, the business pays all fees if it initiates the
arbitration and in both cases the fees can add up to many
thousands of dollars. 45 A third national provider of arbitration
and mediation services, National Arbitration and Mediation
(NAM), states in its rules for consumer arbitration “With respect
to the cost of the arbitration, it must be at a reasonable cost to
the Consumer based on the circumstances of the dispute, the size
and nature of the claim.” 46 Notably, though, unlike AAA and
JAMS, NAM does not cap the cost of consumer-initiated
arbitration and requires the party that initiates the arbitration to
pay an initial filing cost of $575 for disputes up to $10,000 in
value. 47 The fee covers up to one hour of arbitrator’s time with
additional time billed at $680 per hour. 48 Thus in AAA and
JAMS arbitrations, the cost for consumers that wish to initiate
an arbitration is significantly higher and can impose on the
consumer greater inconvenience than access to small claims
courts. And in JAMS arbitration, the potential cost can be quite
high as the arbitrator’s hourly fees and ancillary costs can
quickly amount to a sizable sum out of all proportion to the
potential recovery of damages when these are minor.
In addition to the significantly higher filing fees for dispute
resolution through arbitration rather than through small claims
courts, mandatory arbitration can pose additional significant
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costs to consumers. Businesses are free to choose any national,
regional or local arbitration service provider and need not utilize
a well-established provider with rules that limit the cost for the
consumer who initiate arbitration proceedings. This can result in
arbitration clauses requiring a consumer to pay for half of the
entire cost of arbitration or even the entire cost if she/he fails to
prevail and the arbitration agreement contains a loser-pays
provision. That could leave a consumer liable for thousands of
dollars in arbitration fees. Arbitration agreements can also
require arbitration outside of the consumer’s home county or
state which can be both inconvenient and require additional
travel-related expenses.
While it is true that arbitration clauses that make it
unreasonably difficult or expensive for a consumer to effectively
pursue arbitration can be challenged as unconscionable, the
determination as to validity of the clause will be made not by a
court of law but by the arbitrator if the contract gives the
arbitrator exclusive authority to decide any issue as to the
enforceability of the agreement. 49 Numerous state court
decisions have likewise held that questions of arbitrability of
contracts containing arbitration clauses must be decided in the
first instance by the arbitrator and not the courts. 50
V. ADDITIONAL DISADVANTAGES OF ARBITRATION
CLAUSES FOR CONSUMERS
Cost issues aside, mandatory arbitration can pose additional
notable disadvantages for consumers. One such disadvantage is
a potential denial of access to justice. In the United States unlike
in most of the rest of the world, the American Rule was adopted
in colonial times requiring each person to pay for their own
attorney’s fees in civil litigation. 51 The main justification most
often cited in support of the American System is access to
justice. 52 We are told that the reason each litigant is required to
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pay for their own legal fees is that if “loser pays” were the rule
as it is essentially in the rest of the world, aggrieved individuals
might refrain from pressing their claims in court for fear of
having to pay the prevailing party’s legal expenses if they fail to
prove their case, resulting in a denial of access to justice. 53
Mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer contracts clearly
have the potential for imposing on consumers costs that can far
surpass the cost of litigation in small claims courts and can even
be structured to shift the entire cost of the arbitration to
consumers who do not prevail in arbitration proceedings. 54
Thus, consumers with provable damages in the hundreds (or
even thousands) of dollars who are denied the right to pursue
their claims in small claims courts may well opt not to demand
binding arbitration of their claims for fear of having to pay the
entire cost of the arbitration if they fail to prevail. And while it
is true that arbitration agreements that use AAA or JAMS protect
consumers from “loser pays” fee shifting clauses in the
arbitration contracts, businesses are not required to use AAA or
JAMS and can use the services of NAM or any other arbitration
services provider which does not prevent losing parties from
being required to pay the entire cost of arbitration. Given that
arbitration agreements in consumer contracts are not generally
subject to negotiation, businesses can insulate themselves from
the risk of law suits involving modest sums of loses for
consumers by selecting an arbitration services provider that
allows arbitration fees to be equally paid by consumers and
businesses and/or incorporating a “loser pays” provision that
will require a consumer who does not prevail in an arbitration to
bear the entire cost of the proceeding. In such cases, a consumer
would have to think twice before pressing an arbitral claim that
may require higher fees than any potential arbitral award could
justify if fee splitting is required, or abandoning a claim for fear
of losing when fee shifting is involved. This is a great advantage
for businesses wishing to minimize the risk and cost of litigation,
but it is very difficult to see what concomitant benefit mandatory
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arbitration can have for consumers with modest claims under
such circumstances.
Another factor that can have a chilling effect on consumers’
ability to utilize arbitration for settlement of their claims is the
ability of the arbitration clause to require it in a venue that is
convenient for the business and inconvenient for the consumer.
Businesses that include mandatory arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts can not only prevent consumers from
pursuing claims in their local small claims court where they can
do so quickly, cheaply and most conveniently, but can also
require them to travel to inconvenient locations that can add
additional costs and inconvenience to the dispute settlement
process. This too can have a chilling effect of consumers’ pursuit
of grievances through the arbitration process.
It should come as no surprise, then, that “[i]ndividual
consumers rarely use arbitration and when they do, they recover
very little.” 55 By contrast, corporate claims or counterclaims
resolved by arbitrators have a markedly higher success rate and
consistently yield much higher awards. 56
VI. RECENT STATE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL
EFFORTS TO CURB MANDATORY ARBITRATION
CLAUSES IN CONSUMER CONTRACTS
Although the current pro-arbitration interpretation of the
FAA by the U.S. Supreme Court preempts states from
invalidating mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts, there are some recent efforts by several states to try to
mitigate some of the negative effects of mandatory arbitration
through legislation.
California introduced a Senate Joint Resolution in 2016
urging the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to
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pass final regulations prohibiting mandatory arbitration clauses
in consumer contracts that prohibit class actions. 57
In 2016, legislators in Connecticut introduced a bill that
would declare the following provisions in any consumer contract
that contains a mandatory arbitration clause unconscionable: 58
requiring resolution of legal claims in a venue that is
inconvenient to the consumer; 59 waiving of the consumer's
substantive rights to assert claims or seek remedies provided by
state or federal law; 60 waiving of the consumer's right to seek
punitive, minimum, multiple or other statutory damages as
provided by law or attorney's fees if authorized by statute or
common law; 61 requiring that any action brought by the
consumer with regard to the contract be initiated within a shorter
time period than the applicable statute of limitations; 62 requiring
the consumer pay fees and costs to bring a legal claim that
substantially exceed the fees and costs that would be required to
bring a claim in a state court or that makes no provision for the
waiver of fees and costs for a consumer who cannot afford such
fees and costs; 63 and failing to permit a party to present evidence
in person or to ensure that the consumer can obtain, prior to a
hearing, any information that is material to the issue to be
determined at such hearing. 64
The Illinois Senate considered a bill that would prohibit the
state from doing business with companies that use mandatory
arbitration agreements in contracts with their employees or with
consumers. 65 The bill would also make it presumptively
unconscionable for a mandatory arbitration clause in an
adhesion contract when the contract involves only one
individual (and an entity) and that individual did not write the
contract to contain a requirement for settlement of an arbitration
dispute outside of the county where the individual resides or the
contract was executed. 66 It would also make it presumptively
unconscionable for such contracts to contain a waiver of
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remedies provided by state or federal statutes, 67 a waiver of an
individual’s right to seek punitive damages, 68 a provision
shortening any applicable statute of limitation, 69 and the
payment of any fees and costs above the cost to bring an action
in the state’s courts or in a federal court. 70 The proposed Act
goes on to note that it is the state’s policy to prohibit forced
arbitration in consumer and employment agreements, 71 (a
prohibition that is preempted to the extent that the FAA applies
to the arbitration for reasons previously discussed), and it further
declares mandatory arbitration agreements in insurance contract
involving a consumer unconscionable and void. 72 The last
prohibition should not be preempted by the FAA as the FAA is
inapplicable to insurance contracts because it does not
specifically reference the industry as covered by the Act. 73
The New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled a mandatory
arbitration clause in a consumer contract involving a home
warranty contract unenforceable for lack of mutual assent
because the arbitration clause was included in an inconspicuous
section of the contract under the title of “MEDIATION” with a
font of less than 10-point type and a general lack of clarity in the
drafting language as to the binding arbitration. 74
New York prohibits mandatory arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts for the sale or purchase of consumer goods
and declares such clauses void. 75 But as we have seen such
general prohibitions are unenforceable when preempted by the
FAA when consumer transactions affect interstate commerce. In
an apparent attempt to make consumers better aware of the
existence of mandatory arbitration contracts they sign, New
York has introduced a bill pending before the New York State
Senate as of this writing that would require all contracts for the
sale of goods involving a consumer that have mandatory
arbitration clauses to print such clauses in large type not smaller
than 16 point type. 76 The bill would impose civil penalties on
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merchants of $250 for a first offense and $500 for each
subsequent offense. 77 A second bill also pending before the New
York State Assembly as of this writing would require arbitrators
in consumer and employment arbitration to be neutral (e.g., no
conflict of interest or prior relationship to the parties) and would
give Courts the ability to invalidate arbitral decisions where
conflict of interest was not disclosed by the arbitrator. 78 The Act
would also continue to prohibit mandatory arbitration clauses in
consumer and employment contracts where permissible under
the FAA. 79
There is a bill pending before the Tennessee General
Assembly that would prohibit mandatory arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts. 80 (The bill would also prohibit mandatory
arbitration clauses in contracts involving infants or adjudicated
incompetents 81 and in certain claims with respect to estates in
real property. 82)
VII. SHOULD CONGRESS ACT TO
CONSUMERS’ ACCESS TO JUSTICE?

PRESERVE

In passing the Federal Arbitration Act, Congress intended to
overcome judicial resistance to arbitration and declare a national
policy in favor of arbitration. 83 This goal was achieved, but the
broad interpretation by U.S. Supreme Court decisions of the
FAA has created unintended negative consequences for
consumers with modest claims that at once deny them access to
the courts and can leave them with no economically feasible
means of seeking redress through arbitration. Mandatory
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts coupled with a
restriction on consumers banding together as a class in
arbitration allow businesses to leave aggrieved consumers with
no economically feasible remedy to redress modest losses when
a contract is breached. Given that consumer contracts are
typically adhesion contracts, consumers have no choice but to
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give up the right to seek redress in court (including small claims
courts) and the right to file class action lawsuits when that
restriction is also imposed contractually if they wish to avail
themselves of the product or service they need which are offered
by companies that incorporate these clauses in consumer
contracts.
Mandatory arbitration (and class arbitration waiver) clauses
in consumer contracts overwhelmingly benefit businesses at the
expense of consumers. By using these clauses businesses can
effectively prevent aggrieved consumers to quickly,
conveniently and very inexpensively seek redress in small
claims courts. They can also prohibit them from banding
together in both class action lawsuits and class action arbitration,
thus making it economically unfeasible for consumers who
suffer slight economic losses due to a breach of contract to
obtain remedies for their losses. It is telling that according to at
least one study, companies overwhelmingly use mandatory
arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts but rarely do so
in their non-consumer contracts where both parties have real
negotiating power and both contracting parties must actually
want mandatory arbitration to be a part of the contract. 84 The
study found that mandatory arbitration appeared in more than
three quarters of sampled firms’ consumer contracts but fewer
than one-tenth of their business-to-business contracts. 85 All
companies in the study’s sample that used mandatory arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts also included a waiver of the right
to participate in class-wide arbitration. 86
Congress has repeatedly introduced legislation since 2007
that would ban compulsory arbitration of nearly all employment,
civil rights, franchise, and consumer matters. 87 To date,
however, legislation limiting compulsory arbitration and classwide arbitration wavers in consumer contracts has not been
enacted. It is past time for Congress to address the issue and
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clarify to what extent, if any, the FAA should apply to Consumer
contracts.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Given recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting the
FAA, only Congress can redress the unintended consequences
for consumers in the FAA by clarifying whether the Act was
intended to apply to all business and consumer contracts,
including adhesion contracts. If it is the will of Congress that the
FAA apply to consumer contracts, then Congress needs to find
some reasonable protection for consumers in order to preserve
the right of access to justice.
This could be accomplished in numerous ways short of a
wholesale exclusion of arbitration clauses from consumer
contracts. The U.S. Constitution protects the right to a trial by
jury for all civil claims in excess of $20 in value. 88 That right
should not be abrogated by a clause in a contract of adhesion at
a minimum unless a consumer willfully, knowingly and
specifically gives up that right. One solution is making
mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer contracts optional
and valid only if a consumer agrees to it in a separate writing.
Another solution is to retain the validity of such clauses but
provide consumers and businesses with the option to bring suit
in small claims court in lieu of arbitration. Maintenance of the
status quo should at a minimum require Congress to amend the
FAA to protect the integrity and fairness of the arbitration
process. Such protections should include all of the following:
1.

Requiring arbitration to take place in the
consumer’s home county or in the county
where the contract was executed;
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2. Requiring mandatory arbitration and waivers
of class arbitration clauses in contracts to be
conspicuous in all consumer contracts (e.g.,
written in a larger font size than other
contractual clauses and/or bold-faced font for
emphasis);
3. Prohibiting the selection of an arbitrator with
past business dealings or other conflict of
interest as relates to the parties;
4. Making it presumptively unconscionable to
include waivers of otherwise applicable state
or federal consumer protection laws; and
5. Requiring arbitrators in all contract-based
arbitration involving consumer contracts to
provide the parties written award letters that
include findings of fact and conclusions of
law where applicable to provide a written
record that could be examined by an appellate
court in case of claims of fraud, conflicts of
interest, or arbitrary or capricious decisions
by an arbitrator.
Of course, Congress could also simply make mandatory
arbitration and class-wide arbitration waivers inapplicable in
consumer contracts which is this author’s preferred solution.
In the interest of justice, Congress should revisit this issue of
vital importance to consumers. Even in the current political
climate, this is an issue that should allow Senators and
Representatives to find common ground regardless of their party
affiliation or political ideology as it involves fundamental issues
of fairness and access to justice for all Americans on which
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reasonable politicians should be able to reach that most precious,
rare and nearly extinct quality of effective leadership:
compromise.
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